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This paper shows that adopting a golden rule does not guarantee that public
investment will improve economic outcomes. Our results suggest that only when
the rate of return on public capital is greater than the cost of public borrowing,
expanding public investment is bene￿cial. Otherwise, both macroeconomic stability
and debt sustainability are compromised. As such, we argue that policy-makers should
prioritise the productivity of public investment rather than its level.
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11 Introduction
The optimal choice of ￿scal institutions has been a major issue in policy debates over
the last decade. This was mainly due to sharp rises in de￿cit and debt levels in both
industrial and developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s. The appropriate form
of ￿scal policy design gained even more importance in Europe due to the formation of
the Monetary Union for which ￿scal discipline was viewed as a pre-requisite. To ensure
￿scal discipline the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) set out a number of ￿scal rules to
be adhered to by member countries.
One major criticism of the SGP has been related to its implications for public invest-
ment. It has been argued that the debt and the de￿cit rules of the SGP seriously restrict
policy-makers￿willingness and ability to commit public investment in member countries.1
Central to these arguments has been the notion that public capital spending is intrinsically
di⁄erent from other types of public spending; it has the capacity to enhance the future
output potential of an economy. An alternative ￿scal rule that has been at the centre of
the policy debate is the ￿ golden rule￿ of public ￿nances followed by the UK. One crucial
di⁄erence between the UK￿ s golden rule and the SGP is in the allowance for public in-
vestment in the former as it excludes public capital expenditures from de￿cit targets. In
contrast, the rules of the SGP treat ca￿tal and current expenditure the same. This aspect
of the SGP has been viewed as a major drawback especially given that public investment
as a share of output has been falling in EMU countries since the 1970s and was almost
half of that in the US at the end of 1990s (see, for example, Creel, 2003 and Blanchard
and Giavazzi, 2004).2 As a result, a number of proposals have been put forward in favour
of adopting a golden rule in eurozone instead of the framework speci￿ed by the SGP (see,
for example, Fitoussi and Creel, 2002 and Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2004).3
This paper shows that adopting a golden rule is no guarantee that public investment
is bene￿cial for economic outcomes. Our results indicate that public investment improves
macroeconomic performance only when the rate of return on public capital projects exceeds
the cost of public borrowing. We, therefore, argue that policy-makers should focus on the
quality and the productivity of public investment rather than on its level.
2 The basic model
Consider the following two-period macroeconomic policy-making model that features ex-
plicit interactions between a ￿scal authority (the government) and a monetary authority
(the central bank).4 The government acting through the ￿scal authority controls the
instruments of ￿scal policy; taxes and public spending while the monetary instrument,
1PereØ and V￿lil￿ (2005) present an empirical investigation of the link between ￿scal rules and public
investment in Europe.
2Potential consequences of subjecting public investment to the same ￿scal constraints as current spend-
ing has also been recognized by the IMF. By acknowledging the public capital spending￿ s contribution to
a country￿ s future public revenues and growth potential, the IMF has proposed new initiatives to promote
public investment in countries under IMF-supported programs (see, Hemming and Ter-minassian, 2004).
3An evaluation of various forms of golden rules for EMU can be found in Balassone and Franco (2000).
4Di⁄erent variants of this model are used, for example, by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999) and Ozkan
(2000).
2in￿ ation, is controlled by an independent central bank. To explore the implications of
the policy-maker￿ s strategic decision regarding the composition of public expenditure, we
distinguish between two broad spending categories; investment (gi) and consumption (gc).
Public investment spending consists of spending, for example, on infrastructure, health
and education that has a positive impact on overall productivity. In addition to these
favourable consequences in future periods, public investment spending also yields con-
temporaneous utility to the policy-maker. Current utility also derives from current or
consumption spending which consists of public wages, current public spending on goods,
and other government spending which may yield immediate bene￿ts. Taken together,
















t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the government, ￿t is in￿ ation rate,





actual and desired public consumption (investment) spending as shares of output, ￿1, ￿2
and ￿3 represent, respectively, the government￿ s aversion for the deviations of in￿ ation,
public consumption and investment spending from their respective targets with respect
to the deviations of output from its target and ￿G is the government￿ s discount factor.
Target in￿ ation rate is taken to be zero to indicate the desirability of price stability.









t + (xt ￿ xt)2] (2)
where LCB
t denotes the welfare losses incurred by the central bank, ￿1 is the central
bank￿ s in￿ ation stability weight, ￿CB is the central bank￿ s discount factor. The indepen-
dent central bank is more conservative than the elected government; ￿1 > ￿1 and it does
not discount the future at as a high rate as the elected government; ￿CB > ￿G. Also
note that no terms relating to gc and gi enter the central bank￿ s loss function since public
spending impacts upon the welfare of the elected government but not that of the central
bank.
Now consider a representative competitive ￿rm facing the following production func-
tion: Yt = AtN
￿
t , where Yt represents output, Nt represents labour, At represents the
level of productivity in period t and 0 < ￿ < 1: The ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts is given by Pt(1 ￿
￿t)AtN
￿
t ￿ WtNt, where Pt is the price level, Wt is the wage rate and ￿t is the tax rate
on the total revenue of the ￿rm in period t. The representative ￿rm chooses labour to
3maximize pro￿ts by taking Pt,Wt and ￿t as given. The resulting output supply function
is yt = ￿(pt + 1
￿at ￿ wt ￿ ￿t) + z, where lower case letters represent logs, e.g. yt = ln(Yt);
￿ = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿); ln(1 ￿ ￿) ’ ￿￿ and z = ￿ln(￿).
Our formulation of the productivity e⁄ect of public investment is based on Ismihan
and Ozkan (2004) and is as follows: at = a0+￿gi
t￿1, where ￿ > 0:5 Substituting at into the
previous equation, then normalizing output by subtracting the constant term, z + ￿a0=￿;
for simplicity and utilizing wt = pe
t, where superscript e denotes expectation, yields the
following normalized output supply function:
xt = ￿(￿t +  gi
t￿1 ￿ ￿e
t ￿ ￿t) (3)
In equation (3) x is the normalized (log) output, ￿e is expected in￿ ation,   (= ￿=￿)
is a measure of the productivity of public investment and other variables are as de￿ned
earlier. Equation (3) suggests that a rise in public investment in t = 1 raises output by  
in t = 2 through improved productivity.
The government budget constraint creates the link between the ￿scal and monetary
policies, which is formally given by:
gc
t + gi
t + (1 + rt￿1)dt￿1 = k￿t + ￿t + dt (4)
where dt￿1 denotes the amount of single-period indexed public debt issued (as a ratio
of output) in period t￿1 and to be re-paid in period t, rt￿1 represents the rate at which it
is borrowed, dt is the new debt issue in period t; and k is the real holdings of base money
as share of output. On the left in equation (4) are the outlays consisting of current public
consumption spending, public investment and the current debt service. On the right are
the sources of ￿nancing for these outlays; taxes -seigniorage and revenue taxes- as well as
new borrowing.
In what follows we consider a simple form of golden rule that allows the policy-maker
to run a de￿cit equal to the amount of public investment. Such a rule implies that only
public investment can be paid for by public borrowing
dt = gi
t (5)
A balanced-budget rule applies to current spending that has to be paid out of current
revenues.
2.1 Characterization of equilibrium
Government and the central bank play a Nash game in both periods where the former￿ s
choice variables are public spending (both the level and the composition) and the tax rate
and that of the latter is in￿ ation. The model is solved recursively starting from t = 2.
Both dt and gi
t are chosen only in t = 1 given that both debt re-payments and return
on public investment are due with one period lag and t = 2 is the ￿nal period. Table 1
presents the equilibrium outcomes.
5Ismihan and Ozkan (2004) explore the real e⁄ects of central bank independence in a simpli￿ed frame-
work which abstracts from public debt considerations.
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1: Also note that  N =  ￿(1+r1); S = 1
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￿3S Nb ￿G T 0 if  N T 0; ￿ = 1=(1 +  Nz) > 0; ￿￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ > 0 and
￿ = 1 ￿  Nz￿ > 0.
Table 1 should be read as follows. Each row presents the equilibrium solution for the
variable in that row in reduced form. Thus each entry is the coe¢ cient of the parameter
in that column in the solution for the variable in that row. The ￿rst ￿ve rows denote
outcomes for t = 1 and the following three outcomes in t = 2: Note that outcomes are
de￿ned as gaps between the actual and the targeted values of the relevant variable except
for in￿ ation where the target value is 0. In what follows, we analyze the qualitative e⁄ects
of a rise in gc
1 and gi







1 are always positive.
2.2 Discussion
Outcomes presented in Table 1 suggest that there are clear di⁄erences between the im-
plications of current spending and public investment. Given that under the golden rule
public investment is fully ￿nanced by public borrowing, it has no contemporaneous e⁄ect
on macroeconomic performance; @￿1=@gi
1 = 0, @(gc
1￿gc
1)=@gi
1 = 0 and @(x1￿x1)=@gi
1 = 0.
In contrast, current spending has to be paid out of current taxation -either revenue or in-
￿ ation tax- and taxes are distortionary; higher revenue taxes reduce output and higher
in￿ ation is undesirable. Thus, public consumption has an unfavourable contemporaneous
e⁄ect on macroeconomic performance, @￿1=@gc
1 > 0 and @(x1 ￿ x1)=@gc
1 > 0.
As to the intertemporal implications of capital spending, there are two channels through
which public investment committed today a⁄ects future outcomes. One is the direct ef-
fect; expanding public investment in t = 1 expands the productivity and thus equilibrium
output -and hence the tax base- in t = 2. The greater the productivity coe¢ cient,  , the
5larger the scale of output expansion in t = 2: The second is the indirect e⁄ect arising due
to the implications of servicing the public debt in t = 2 that was raised in t = 1 to pay for
the public investment. Clearly, the ￿rst e⁄ect is favourable and the second is unfavorable.
It follows that, therefore, the overall impact of public investment would be determined by
the net productivity e⁄ect,  N =   ￿ (1 + r1). This can be seen from Table 1. The three
values in the last column corresponding to ￿2;(gc
2 ￿ gc
2) and (x2 ￿ x2) are all unambigu-
ously negative functions of  N, suggesting a favourable e⁄ect in the presence of positive
net productivity. That is, expanding public investment in t = 1 makes the policy-maker
better o⁄ in t = 2 only when  N > 0.
When the net productivity e⁄ect is negative, a rise in capital spending leads to a worse
outcome in t = 2; raising all three of in￿ ation, current spending and output gaps. This
is because the resources required to re-pay the debt more than o⁄sets the return from
public investment. The shortfall has to be paid out of higher taxes and/or higher in￿ ation
forcing the policy-maker face a worse policy trade-o⁄ in t = 2: The outcome is therefore
a deterioration in welfare given that welfare losses increase with increases in deviations of
in￿ ation, output and public spending from target levels.
The following proposition formalizes these relationships.
Proposition Under the golden rule, the e⁄ect of public investment undertaken in t = 1
on the macroeconomic performance in t = 2 depends on the net bene￿t of public spending,
 N.
i) The higher is public investment in the ￿rst period the lower is the in￿ation rate,
public consumption gap and output gap; hence, the better is macroeconomic performance
in the ￿nal period, if  N > 0.
ii) A change in public investment in the ￿rst period does not a⁄ect the macroeconomic
performance in the ￿nal period, if  N = 0.
iii) The higher is public investment in the ￿rst period the worse is macroeconomic perfor-
mance in the ￿nal period, if  N < 0.
Proof. The derivative of ￿2 with respect to gi
1 is ￿
1=￿1
S  N￿; and this derivative is
unambiguously negative/zero/positive when  N > 0 /  N = 0 /  N < 0 ; respectively:
Similarly, the derivative of (gc
2 ￿ gc
2) with respect to gi
1 is ￿
1=￿2
S  N￿; which is again
negative/zero/positive when  N > 0 /  N = 0 /  N < 0; respectively. The deriv-
ative of (x2 ￿ x2) with respect to gi
1 is ￿
1=￿
S  N￿; which is also unambiguously nega-
tive/zero/positive when  N > 0 /  N = 0 /  N < 0 ; respectively.
3 Concluding remarks
In countries where return from investment is low relative to the cost of public borrowing,
expanding public investment is likely to deteriorate the overall macroeconomic environ-
ment with obvious adverse consequences for debt dynamics. Our results, therefore, suggest
6that policy-makers should focus on the quality -the productivity- of public investment not
just its level.
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